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Abstract—Users often choose passwords that are easy to
remember but also easy to guess by attackers. Recent studies
have revealed the vulnerability of textual passwords to shoulder
surfing and keystroke loggers. It remains a critical challenge
in password research to develop an authentication scheme that
addresses these security issues, in addition to offering good
memorability. Motivated by psychology research on humans’
cognitive strengths and weaknesses, we explore the potential of
cognitive questions as a way to address the major challenges in
user authentication. We design, implement, and evaluate Q-A,
a novel cognitive-question-based password system that requires
a user to enter the letter at a given position in her answer
for each of six personal questions (e.g. “What is the name of
your favorite childhood teacher?”). In this scheme, the user
does not need to memorize new, artificial information as her
authentication secret. Our scheme offers 28 bits of theoretical
password space, which has been found sufficient to prevent online
brute-force attacks. Q-A is also robust against shoulder surfing
and keystroke loggers. We conducted a multi-session in-lab user
study to evaluate the usability of Q-A; 100% of users were able
to remember their Q-A password over the span of one week,
although login times were high. We compared our scheme with
random six character passwords and found that login success
rate in Q-A was significantly higher. Based on our results, we
suggest that Q-A would be most appropriate in contexts that
demand high security and where logins occur infrequently (e.g.,
online bank accounts).
Index Terms—Usable security; user authentication; cognitive
question
I. INTRODUCTION
Compared with the tremendous advancement of digital
devices over the past few decades, passwords are a stubborn
legacy technology that hangs on for want of something better.
Recall-based user-chosen textual password is the most widely
used authentication scheme on the Web, but it is fraught
with security problems because of password reuse [1] and
predictable patterns [2, 3] that make this scheme vulnerable to
online guessing attacks [4, 5]. Password restriction policies are
found to have limited impact on ensuring security and in some
cases adversely affect password memorability [2, 6]. System-
assigned random passwords provide higher security, but suffer
from memorability problems [7]. Multiple variants [8–11] have
been proposed to improve memorability in this respect, yet
none of these schemes has shown significant improvement for
the examined usability metrics.
Users have cognitive limitations that define our potential for
interaction with computers. Existing password systems fail to
fully address these limitations, nor do they leverage humans’
cognitive strengths.
A. Motivation
The most prominent dilemma studied in the research on user
authentication is the delicate balance between memorability
and preventing successful guessing. Existing schemes rely
on information specifically memorized for the purpose of
authentication, such as the string of characters that make up
a textual password. This means that the information is less
memorable for users than information that users already know
because it is meaningful for them. This in turn means that
users tend to choose passwords that are easy to guess.
Beyond guessing resistance, however, other security con-
cerns have been shown to be at least as important. Florencio
et al. point out [12] that observation attacks, such as shoulder
surfing (external observation attack) and keystroke loggers (in-
ternal observation attack [13]), appear to be the most prevalent
attacks, in which strong passwords are just as susceptible to
being stolen by an attacker as weak ones. They find that none
of the password “best practices” offers any real protection
against these attacks. This observation is also supported by
the study of Florencio and Herley [14], who examined the
password policies of 75 different websites and found that their
password policies address only guessing attacks and, in few
cases, passwords reuse across sites.
The susceptibility to shoulder surfing and keystroke loggers
is generally high when users log in from public comput-
ers [15]. A two-week-long field study [16] on real life Web
usage found that half of the participants used public computers
to access online accounts.
Thus, one of the most challenging tasks in user authenti-
cation today is to develop a text-based authentication scheme
that satisfies the following requirements: i) Provides protection
against observation attacks, ii) Offers good memorability, and
iii) Provides sufficient entropy to prevent online brute-force
attacks.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we explore the potential of cognitive ques-
tions in addressing these challenges by incorporating the
scientific understanding of long-term memory to advance the
security and usability properties that can be provided in an
authentication system. In particular, we propose Q-A, a new
authentication scheme in which a user registers by selecting
ar
X
iv
:1
40
7.
72
77
v1
  [
cs
.H
C]
  2
7 J
ul 
20
14
and answering six cognitive questions (e.g., “Who was your
favorite high school teacher?”) from a set of twenty questions.
During login, the user is shown one question at a time
and asked to enter the letter at a random position in her
answer. This process is repeated for all six questions, and
correctly entering all six letters is required to authenticate. The
contributions of Q-A are given below (see §III for a detailed
discussion).
Usability. A survey study [17] on 25 different password
schemes found that memorability can be supported by leverag-
ing pre-existing user-specific knowledge, rather than requiring
users to memorize new information that is artificially con-
structed or random. This finding inspires our application of
cognitive questions in Q-A, which gains usability advantages
over other text-based password schemes [9–11, 18] in the
following way:
• Authentication secrets are easier to remember in Q-
A, since it asks users for already known information,
while the other schemes query for specifically memorized
information.
• Psychology studies [19–21] reveal that it is difficult to
remember information spontaneously without memory
cues, where cognitive questions work as cues to retrieve
the corresponding answers from a long-term memory [11,
22].
• Our scheme allows users to enter case-insensitive letters
for authentication, while traditional textual passwords
may contain numbers, upper-case letters, and special
characters, which may require additional time and effort
to enter, especially from portable devices (e.g., cellular
phones).
In our study, users had a 100% memorability rate after one
week, which was significantly higher than that for randomly
assigned six-character passwords consisting of only lowercase
letters. They reported high levels of satisfaction with the
usability and security of Q-A, despite a long average time
to log in.
Security. To the best of our knowledge, Q-A is the first
text-based authentication scheme that addresses both internal
and external observation attacks. The security features of our
system are as follows:
• Typically, cognitive questions are prone to guessing by
acquaintances attacks that exploit the knowledge about
personal information of a user [23]. The analysis of Just
and Aspinall [23] shows that three questions are sufficient
to guarantee reasonable security for authentication based
on cognitive questions. Our study on Q-A satisfied these
security requirements, where a set of questions were
carefully selected considering both usability and security
metrics [23, 24], and each user was asked to answer six
questions from this set to measure the usability of Q-A
for a system with high security requirements.
• Q-A offers the variant response feature, where users’ en-
tries vary across different login sessions to gain resilience
against observation attacks.
• Although each security question offers relatively low en-
tropy compared with a moderately strong password [23],
selecting random letters from the answers to six different
questions makes for a string of characters that is partially
random and therefore hard to guess [7]. The theoretical
password space (28 bits) offered by Q-A is sufficient to
prevent online brute-force attacks [14].
With Q-A, we explore the idea of using information that
is meaningful to users and already held in long-term memory
for a primary authentication mechanism. By developing and
evaluating the Q-A design, we show that such a mechanism
can be built with reasonable usability and security properties.
We hope that this inspires researchers to further investigate
ways to leverage such information for better schemes.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we give an overview of the text-based
authentication mechanisms and the proposed techniques to
gain resilience against observation attacks.
Traditional password. Recall-based user-chosen textual
password is the most widely used authentication scheme on the
web. However, it is vulnerable to online guessing attacks [4, 5]
that exploit password reuse and predictable patterns, since
users use the same password on an average of six different
accounts [1] and follow predictable strategies (e.g., using
dictionary words or names) while creating passwords [2, 3].
To motivate users to create stronger passwords, different
password restriction policies [2, 25] have been deployed, such
as increasing minimum length of passwords, using combina-
tion of different types of characters, asking users to change
passwords at regular intervals, and using password strength
meters. However, in separate studies, Proctor et al. [26] and
Shay et al. [2] reported that password restriction policies do
not necessarily lead to more secure passwords. Rather, in some
cases, they adversely affect the memorability.
Mnemonic Password. Kuo et al. [18] studied the guessing-
resistance of user-selected mnemonic phrase based passwords,
in which the user chooses a memorable phrase and uses a
character (often the first letter) to represent each word in the
phrase. Results [18] show that user-selected mnemonic pass-
words are slightly more resistant to brute-force attacks than
traditional text-based passwords, . Mnemonic passwords are
found more predictable when users choose common phrases to
create their passwords. A properly chosen dictionary may in-
crease the success rate in guessing mnemonic passwords [18].
System-assigned password. Randomly assigned textual
passwords provide better resilience against online guessing
attacks in comparison to user-chosen text-based passwords [7].
Wright et al. [9] compared the usability of three different
system-assigned textual password schemes: i) Recognition-
based words, ii) Recall-based words, and iii) Recall-based
random letters. In the recognition-based scheme, the user has
to recognize a set of words, each word being displayed on
screen amongst a set of distracter words. In the second scheme,
users have to remember a list of four whole words, which
serves as one password. In the last scheme, users are assigned
random passwords of six lower-case letters. The password
Fig. 1. A screenshot of a demo of the Q-A.
space for all the conditions are kept same (28 bits). Results for
memorability show that word recall performs the worst and no
significant difference is found between recognition and letter
recall. Furthermore, the time required to login is significantly
different for all pairings, and notably worst in the recognition
condition.
System-assigned passphrase. Shay et al. [8] investigated
the usability of system-assigned passphrases (space-delimited
sets of natural language words), which did not show signifi-
cant improvement over the system-assigned textual passwords
of similar entropy. The study [8] indicates that a majority
of participants in each condition wrote down their pass-
words/passphrases, and around half of the participants who
did not write them down failed to recall their authentication
secrets after two days.
PTP. Forget et al. [10, 11] proposed the Persuasive Text
Passwords (PTP) scheme, in which, after a password is created
by the user, PTP improves its security by placing randomly-
chosen characters at random positions into the password. Users
may shuffle to re-position the random characters until they find
a suitable combination to memorize. PTP is resilient against
attacks exploiting password reuse and predictable patterns.
However, knowing that a system uses PTP and knowing how
PTP works would allow attackers to refine their cracking
strategies. The memorability for PTP is found to be just
25% when two random characters are inserted at random
positions [11].
Cognitive question. The primary investigation of Furnell
et al. [22] reported that 70% users preferred to have cognitive
questions for authentication. However, most of the questions
used in their study (e.g., “What is the name of your favorite
relation?”, “What is your favorite shape?”) offer very limited
entropy and thus can be easily guessed by attackers. Also,
their approach is vulnerable to shoulder surfing and keystroke
loggers. Later studies [23, 24, 27] performed comprehensive
analysis on cognitive questions to figure out the usability and
security of different types of questions. We have carefully
considered their findings to design Q-A. A detailed discussion
follows in the next section.
Resilience to observation attacks. Textual passwords are
vulnerable to external observation attacks, such as shoulder
surfing [28]. De Luca et al. [29] examined the impact of
fake cursors in providing resilience against shoulder surfing
when passwords are entered through an on-screen keyboard.
However, results show that the users act predictably to identify
their active cursor (e.g., moving the mouse cursor to the border
of the interaction area or moving the mouse in small circles),
which may make it easy for the shoulder surfer to find the
real cursor and subsequently the authentication secret from
on-screen keyboard entries.
Gaining the user’s credentials through malware (e.g.,
keystroke loggers, mouse loggers) is called an internal ob-
servation attack [13]. Text-based passwords are prone to
keystroke loggers [15]. A few tricks have been proposed to
hide passwords from keystroke loggers, such as typing fake
characters in multiple text-boxes at the time of entering the
password [15]. These tricks, however, require users to be con-
scious about keystroke loggers and take proactive measures,
which is difficult [1, 3].
Conclusion and open problems. As we see from the
above discussion, textual password schemes that provide bet-
ter memorability are vulnerable to guessing attacks (e.g.,
traditional and mnemonic passwords). On the other hand,
text-based passwords with higher resilience against guessing
attacks suffer from memorability problems (e.g., system as-
signed passwords and passphrases, PTP). Moreover, textual
passwords are vulnerable to observation attacks.
Thus, despite a large body of research, it remains a critical
challenge in password research to build an authentication sys-
tem that offers both high memorability and guessing resilience,
with robustness against observation attacks.
III. THE Q-A DESIGN AND SCIENTIFIC MOTIVATIONS
In this section, we first explain the basic design of Q-
A. We then describe our approach to address the usability
and security concerns with cognitive questions, followed by
a detailed discussion on the usability and security features
offered by Q-A.
Q-A is based on cognitive questions (e.g., “What is the
name of your favorite childhood teacher?”), which inherently
leverage existing long-term memories, information that is
known to users based on their life experience. Q-A invokes
the answers to cognitive questions in a novel way. At the time
of registration, the user is shown a set of 20 carefully selected
questions, of which she must select six questions to answer.
These answers, in total, constitute her authentication secret.
We choose the 20 questions carefully to ensure that each one
asks for alphabetical answers with a high amount of entropy,
such as the name of a person or a location.
During login, a user is presented with all six selected
questions, one at a time. She does not have to enter the whole
answers. Instead, for each question, the user is asked to enter
a single letter from a particular position in her answer. Every
time a user logs in, this position is randomly chosen by the
system individually for each question. So, in a login session, a
user may be asked to enter the letter in the second position for
the first question, in the fourth position for the second question,
and so on. These positions will vary in the subsequent login
sessions. For example, if a user’s answer is “Anderson”, and
at a given login session she is asked to enter the second letter
of this answer, she has to enter ‘n’. In this way, a user has
to correctly enter a letter for all six questions for a successful
login.
A. Usability and Security of Cognitive Questions
In this section, we describe our approach in Q-A to address
the usability and security concerns with cognitive questions.
1) Usability: Just and Aspinall defined three metrics to
measure the usability of a cognitive question: i) Applicability,
ii) Memorability, and iii) Repeatability [23]. This provides a
useful guide to selecting appropriate questions for Q-A. We
carefully considered these metrics while selecting questions
for our study.
Applicability. Not every user can effectively answer ev-
ery cognitive question. Users in our system choose any six
questions from a set of twenty questions that they find most
applicable to them. Offering a greater number of questions
would further increase the applicability of the system.
Memorability. Research shows that a user can easily recall
the answers of cognitive questions that are related to her long-
term memory [23, 24]. Selecting such questions ensures that
the user does not need to devote much cognitive effort in
learning the Q-A passwords, as they are simply answers that
she already knows.
A study by Schechter et al. reveals that the participants who
used weak placeholder answers during the study failed to recall
them later [24]. So, with a few basic restrictions in place to
guard against poor answers (see §III-C), it should typically be
easier for a user to remember the real answer to a question
than a weak placeholder answer (‘Aab’).
The study of Furnell et al. [22] shows that confusion
between capital and lowercase letters is a prominent reason
for making mistakes when answering a cognitive question. We
address this by ignoring case in our scheme.
Repeatability. Just and Aspinall indicate that repeatability
can be improved by providing users with the fixed format
of answers to the questions that ask about dates or locations
(e.g., different formats for date: ‘Feb-05, 1992’, ‘02-05-1992’,
‘02/05/1992’) [23]. To provide higher entropy, we recommend
to avoid questions that ask for numerical answers, and this
includes questions about specific dates. For location-related
questions, instead of imposing any specific format on users,
we prefer to be more specific with the questions to ensure
repeatability. For example: instead of asking “Where did your
father and mother meet?”, we would ask “In what city or town
did your father and mother meet?” We recommend providing
a fixed format for the answer to a question in which being
specific with the question does not resolve the repeatability
issues.
2) Security: The most important security concerns with
cognitive questions include: i) User-created questions, ii)
Guessing by acquaintances attacks, and iii) Common answers.
We address these security issues in the following way.
User-created questions. If users are allowed to freely create
their own questions, many users will not choose sufficiently
secure questions [23]. On the other hand, it may have usability
concerns for many users if the questions are strictly assigned
by the system. Q-A balances these trade-offs by asking users
to select any six questions from a larger set.
Guessing by acquaintances. Typically, cognitive questions
are prone to targeted guessing attacks, in which attackers ex-
ploit the knowledge about personal information of a user [23,
24]. One’s mother’s maiden name and Social Security Number
(SSN) in the US are particularly well-known examples of such
questions. It is possible to select suitable questions, but still
the amount of entropy in a single answer is typically lower
than for a password [23, 24, 27].
Just and Aspinall [23] show that three questions are suffi-
cient to guarantee reasonable security for cognitive-question-
based authentication. In our study, we asked users to answer
six questions to measure the usability of Q-A for a system
with high security requirements.
Common answers. The answers to some cognitive ques-
tions are generally common among users. For example, blue
or pink may be common answers to the question “What’s your
favorite color?”. The prior studies [23, 24] have found that
carefully selected questions can make common answers less
of an issue for most users. The questions for Q-A were selected
carefully based on the prior usability and security analysis on
cognitive questions [22–24, 27].
B. Usability Features and Memory Retrieval in Q-A
In this section, we state the usability advantages of Q-A
from the perspective of cognitive psychology. Q-A offers two
important usability advantages over other text-based authenti-
cation systems [9–11, 18]:
• Known Information: Q-A queries for already known in-
formation, while the other schemes query for specifically
memorized information.
• Memory Cues: Q-A provides users with the questions
that work as cues to retrieve the corresponding answers
from user’s memory, so as to log in successfully.
Known Information. From the viewpoint of cognitive
psychology [30, 31], Q-A is closely tied with the concept of
episodic memory [30, 31], which refers to the autobiographical
event that the user can accurately recall, since she was part
of it. Episodic memory incorporates the time and place of a
personally meaningful event with the associated feeling and
contextual information. For example, recalling the celebration
of new millennium’s eve involves figuratively traveling back in
time to precisely remember the place and the people associated
with that event. Thus, cognitive-question-based authentication
systems like Q-A aid password memorability, since a user does
not need to memorize the answers specifically for authentica-
tion to an online account.
Memory Cues. Psychology research has shown that it is
difficult to remember information spontaneously without mem-
ory cues [19–21] . This suggests that authentication schemes
should provide users with cues to aid memory retrieval. Ellis
and Kvavilashvili state that memory cues support prospective
memory [32], which is the ability to generate, retain, and
later recall information in the appropriate context. Encoding
specificity theory [31] postulates that the most effective cues
are those that are present at the time of remembering. If
semantic information about a word is processed at the time
of learning, then that information can successfully be used to
cue memory. Thus, the word ‘Millennium Eve’ can only be
used to cue memory of the word ‘New York’ if the subject
encodes the semantic information linking the two objects at
the time of encoding.
Generate-recognize theory [19] and Associative-strength
theory [33] also focus on the effectiveness of cues in aiding
memorability [20, 21]. Generate-recognize theory [19] specu-
lates that retrieval is a two-step process, where in the generate
phase, a list of candidate words is formed by searching the
long-term memory. Then in the recognize phase, the list of
words is evaluated to see if they can be recognized as the
sought out memory. According to this theory, a cue can help
not only in generating a relevant candidate list, but also in
recognizing the appropriate word from that list. Associative-
strength theory [33] states that a cue becomes effective if it
has previously occurred with the remembered event in the past.
The theory assumes that memory is structured as a network
that connects all items in memory, and items in memory with
stronger ties between them make better cues.
C. Security Features in Q-A
In this section, we describe the security features offered by
Q-A.
1) Guessing resistance: The theoretical password space (28
bits) offered by Q-A is sufficient to prevent online brute-force
attacks [14].
Theoretical password space. The questions in our scheme
ask users for alphabetical answers (e.g., “what was the name
of your first teacher?”), where the answers are case-insensitive.
During login, the user is asked to enter the character at a given
position in her answer. In this respect, the size of the domain
for an alphabetical entry (26) is larger than a numerical entry
(10). Thus, alphabetical answers provide higher resilience
against online brute-force attacks [5, 34], in which an attacker
tries all elements within a search space to obtain the password.
The user has to enter a letter for each of six questions. The
space for this condition will therefore be log2(26)
6 ≈ 28 bits.
Florencio and Herley’s study on security policies [14] suggests
that 20 bits of theoretical password space suffices for an online
environment with lockout rules.
Effective password space. Both in Q-A and in the study
of password policies, only theoretical entropy is considered,
though letters from random positions in the answers to cog-
nitive questions may also have more effective entropy than
user-selected passwords prone to dictionary attacks. In Q-A,
the effective password space may vary for different questions,
which requires to consider variation in answers in addition to
general letter frequency. For example, the letter frequencies
of names of people and locations will vary significantly by
country and region. It would be an interesting area for future
work to analyze the effective entropy of Q-A considering the
letter frequency found in answers to different questions and
the variation in answers in different languages, ethnicities, and
countries.
Guard against poor answers. We have deployed some
basic restrictions in our system to guard against poor answers
(e.g. minimum three characters in an answer, no repeat an-
swers between questions, at least two different letters in an
answer), which might motivate users to give their real answers
that, with the right questions, should have a large space of both
possible and probable answers.
2) Observation attacks: Having authentication information
vary across login sessions is known as variant response [17].
During login, the variant response feature makes our system
more resilient against observation attacks like shoulder surfing,
as compared to other text-based password schemes where the
same set of characters is entered as password in every login
session.
Shoulder surfing. When the user enters her credentials,
either at registration or login, the answers are shown as
asterisks or dots (as with regular password entry) to minimize
the risk of shoulder surfing. During login, a user enters the
letter at a given position in her answer, and to learn that letter
and its position in the answer, the shoulder surfer needs to
observe both the monitor and keyboard at a time, which has
been found to be difficult in practice [28]. The requirements
to observe the letters for all six questions further increase the
hurdles for an attacker.
Even if a shoulder surfer can learn the letter and its position,
he is likely to be asked to enter a letter of different position
when he tries to log in as the user. Only a good guess of
the entire answer for all six questions gives the attacker a
reasonable chance of logging in.
The shoulder surfer may attempt to gain the user’s creden-
tials when she enters the entire answer to a question at the
time of registration. Although answers are shown as asterisks
or dots (as with regular password entry) to reduce the risk of
shoulder surfing, we recommend that the users register in a
secure environment (e.g., avoiding public terminals) to ensure
maximum security.
Keystroke and mouse loggers. Gaining a user’s au-
thentication credentials through malware, such as keystroke
loggers and mouse loggers, is called an internal obser-
vation attack [13]. A system provides resilience against
keystroke/mouse loggers when the keyboard/mouse entries
for authentication vary across subsequent login sessions [17].
Thus, the variant response feature in Q-A offers higher re-
silience against keystroke loggers as compared to a pass-
word system where the same set of letters is entered (using
keyboard) during each login session. Our system is clearly
resilient to mouse loggers, as we don’t use mouse input.
The security of Q-A can be further improved by asking users
to answer more than six questions during registration and then
drawing six at random for each authentication attempt. In this
case, when an attacker tries to log in as a user, he may get
different questions than the ones he gains through observation
attacks. We will explore the usability of this approach in future
work.
3) Social engineering attacks: Social engineering refers to
the psychological manipulation of people so that they divulge
confidential information [17]. Phishing [17] is a common form
of social engineering attack.
Phishing. In a phishing attack, users are redirected to
fraudulent websites to enter their credentials. In this case, the
phishing victim will very likely get different questions from
the ones she normally uses to log in, since a phisher would not
typically have access to the user’s login sessions. This means
that not only will the user enter information that is useless to
the attacker, she may realize that something is wrong and end
the session.
Fake calls. Users may be tricked to reveal credentials
by any means, e.g., phone calls from a fake help desk or
credit company [17]. Q-A does not provide direct resilience to
social engineering when the users disclose their authentication
secrets to the attacker. However, a site with high security
requirements can use unique questions to avoid question and
answer reuse and overlap between sites so that attackers cannot
gain access to other accounts by acquiring password for a
single account. We propose to explore this issue further in
future work.
IV. STUDY DESIGN
Two prior text-based authentication systems [8, 9] aim to
provide a usable solution to the security issues with passwords.
Both papers compared their scheme with system-assigned
random textual passwords (control passwords), where the
results did not show significant improvement over control
passwords in terms of memorability. We compare Q-A with
control passwords and keep the theoretical password space the
same (28 bits) for both conditions to examine whether Q-A
offers better memorability in this respect.
In this study, we used a within-subjects design consisting
of two experimental conditions (e.g., Q-A and control pass-
words). Using a within-subjects design controls for individual
differences, and permitted the use of statistically stronger
hypothesis tests. The experiments performed as part of this
research received approval from our university’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB) for human subject research.
A. Participants, Apparatus and Environment
For this experiment, we recruited 22 university students (6
women, 16 men) from diverse backgrounds, including majors
from Biology, Engineering, Interdisciplinary Study, etc. The
mean age of the participants was 27. They make regular
use of the Internet and websites that require authentication.
Each participant was compensated with a $10 gift card for
participating in this study.
To administer this experiment, we created two realistic and
distinct websites outfitted with the password scheme according
to our two conditions: Q-A and control passwords. For both
conditions, we used banking sites, but designed the interfaces
with a different look and feel. Upon successful login at each
bank site, the participants were forwarded to a dummy account
overview page, to give them the feeling of using online
banking services.
We carefully reviewed the prior usability and security
studies on cognitive questions [22–24, 27] to select the 20
questions for this study. The lab studies were conducted with
one participant at a time to allow the researchers to observe
the user’s interaction with the system.
B. Procedure
We conducted the experiment in two sessions, each lasting
around 30 minutes. The second session took place one week
after the first one to test memorization of the password. Note
that the one-week delay reflects a common interval used in
authentication studies (e.g., [9, 35, 36]). A field study [16]
on real-life web usage found that one week is larger than the
maximum average interval for a user between her subsequent
logins to any of her important accounts [16]. Thus, we used
this interval to examine the usability of our scheme.
1) Session 1: Before starting the experiment, we provided
a consent form for the participants to read and sign, if they
agreed. To compensate for the novelty effect, we asked the
participants to perform one practice trial for authentication
with Q-A. We did not collect data for this practice trial. The
subsequent steps of the experiment are as follows:
Sign-up. During sign-up (we alternatively use the term
registration) with Q-A, participants were shown a set of twenty
questions, and they selected any six questions to answer, which
constituted their password. Participants were also asked to
sign-up with another site, where they were assigned a random
six character password (control password).
To control for order effects, we employed counter balancing,
so that all the participants would not see the schemes in the
same order. Half of the participants used Q-A first, and the
other half used the control password first.
Distraction. After sign-up, the participants were asked to
count down in threes from a randomly chosen four-digit
number for 45 seconds. This type of distraction flushes the
textual working memory [37] and simulates a longer passage
of time by focusing their attention on a separate, cognitively-
difficult task. Participants were then given questionnaire that
gathered demographic information.
Login (Recall-1). The participants were asked to log into
each of those same sites, to demonstrate that the passwords had
been memorized. Participants who were unable to reproduce
their passwords during login, were shown the passwords.
2) Session 2: The second appointment took place one week
after the first one. The participants were asked to log into
each of the two sites (Recall-2). After they had finished, an
anonymous paper-based survey was conducted to get their
opinion on the overall experiences of using the authentication
schemes. Participants were then compensated and thanked for
their time.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the results of the user study
described in §IV. We label the login performance of partic-
ipants in session 1 and session 2 as Recall-1 and Recall-2,
respectively. Here, we tested the following hypotheses:
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Fig. 2. Login success rate
A. Hypothesis 1
H1a: The login success rate for Q-A and control passwords
would not significantly differ in Recall-1.
H1b: The login success rate for Q-A would be significantly
higher than that of control passwords in Recall-2.
In Q-A, users don’t have to memorize any new authentica-
tion secrets, as their password instead comes from cognitive
questions related to their real life. However, in the control
condition, the user is required to memorize a random string of
characters as her password. In Recall-1, users were asked to
enter their control passwords within a short period of learning
it. So, we hypothesized that the login success rate for Q-A and
control passwords would not significantly differ in Recall-1,
but that Q-A would perform significantly better than control
passwords in Recall-2, in terms of login success rate.
We observed a 100% login success rate for Q-A in both
Recall-1 and Recall-2. In the control condition, login success
rate was 91% in Recall-1 and 77% in Recall-2. Whether or not
a participant successfully authenticated is a binary measure, so
we use McNemar’s tests when we analyze the login success
rate for our within-subjects experiment. Our analysis shows
that login success rate did not differ significantly between Q-A
and control conditions in Recall-1, X 2(1, N = 22) = 0.5, p =
0.24. In Recall-2, however, the login success rate for Q-A was
significantly higher than the control passwords, X 2(1, N =
22) = 3.2, p < .05. H1a and H1b are supported by these
results.
B. Hypothesis 2
H2: There would be a significant difference in login time
between Q-A and control passwords in both Recall-1 and
Recall-2.
Since Q-A requires entering the letter of a random position
for as many as six answers, we hypothesized that for both
Recall-1 and Recall-2, the login time for the control passwords
would be significantly less than that of Q-A. Table I summa-
rizes the results for login time, which shows that the mean
login time in Q-A was 53.9 seconds in Recall-1 (median: 51
seconds) and 56.9 seconds in Recall-2 (median: 53 seconds).
The mean login time (38.1 seconds in Recall-1, 43.7 seconds
in Recall-2) in the control condition seems to be affected by
the outliers, where the median login time was 11.5 seconds in
Recall-1 and 13 seconds in Recall-2.
We did not get matched pair of subjects while comparing
the time for successful logins in our study conditions, since
a number of participants who succeeded to log in using
Q-A, failed in control condition. So, instead of Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, we used a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to
evaluate the difference in login time between Q-A and control
passwords. Wilcoxon tests are similar to t-tests, but make no
assumptions about the distributions of the compared samples,
which is appropriate to the count data in these conditions.
In Recall-1, we found a significant difference in login time
(W = 72, p < 0.01). The difference was significant in Recall-
2 as well (W = 350, p < 0.05). All these findings provide
enough evidence to support H2.
C. Hypothesis 3
H3: During login in Q-A, the mean time required to enter a
letter of the given position would vary significantly for different
positions in the answer in both Recall-1 and Recall-2.
The cognitive effort required to fetch a letter from the third
position of an answer might be higher than entering a letter
in the first position. So, we hypothesized that the mean time
required to enter a letter would vary significantly for different
positions in the answer.
We used a Kruskal-Wallis test for Hypothesis 3, which
is similar to ANOVA, but does not make any assumption
about the distributions of the compared samples, and is thus
appropriate in this context. The Kruskal-Wallis test demon-
strated that for Recall-1, the mean time required to enter a
letter varied significantly for different positions in the answers,
X 2(4) = 15.32, p < 0.01. However, for Recall-2, the
differences were not statistically significant, X 2(4) = 4.79,
p = 0.31. So, H3 is partially supported by our results.
D. Notable Findings
1) Number of attempts: A successful authentication in Q-
A requires entering the correct letter for six questions, but we
didn’t restrict the number of attempts a user could make before
entering her authentication secret correctly. It allowed us
tracking the number of mistakes a user committed before she
was able to log in successfully. Q-A showed quite promising
results in this respect.
In Recall-1, 82% participants succeeded on the first attempt
to enter the correct letter for all six questions. The other
participants made a mistake for only one question and entered
the correct letter in the second attempt. In Recall-2, 73%
TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR REGISTRATION AND LOGIN TIME (IN
SECONDS)
Scheme Study Mean Median SD
Q-A
Registration 116.6 103 43
Recall-1 53.9 51 17.8
Recall-2 56.9 53 20.5
Control
Registration 48.1 45.5 27.1
Recall-1 38.1 11.5 70.8
Recall-2 43.7 13 55
TABLE II
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES FOR THE USABILITY OF Q-A. SCORES ARE
OUT OF 10. * INDICATES THAT THE SCALE WAS REVERSED.
Questions Mode Median
Logging in using Q-A password was easy 10 8.5
Q-A passwords are easy to remember 9 9
With practice, I could quickly
10 9
enter my Q-A password
*I found Q-A too time-consuming (i.e., I
4 4.5
found Q-A to not take too much time)
*I prefer system-assigned textual
8 7passwords to Q-A (i.e., I prefer Q-A to
system-assigned textual passwords)
I could easily use Q-A every day 10 8
I could easily use Q-A every week 10 9
participants succeeded on the first attempt for all six questions.
Of the other six participants (27%) who made a mistake
in a question on the first attempt, four succeeded in the
second attempt and the other two required no more than four
attempts before entering the correct letter. One participant
made mistakes in two questions; no other participant made
any mistakes in more than one question in Recall-2.
For the control passwords in Recall-1, 82% of participants
succeeded to log in on the first attempt. One participant
required 10 attempts to log in successfully, as he did not
notice that Caps Lock was on. Q-A overcomes this limitation,
since the users’ responses are not case sensitive. In Recall-2,
68% of participants entered their control passwords correctly
in the first attempt. The participants who were successfully
authenticated after multiple attempts in Recall-2 required four
attempts on average with a maximum of eight attempts.
2) Registration: In Q-A, participants were able to com-
plete registration in less than two minutes on average (see
Table I). The mean time to register in the control condition
was 48.1 seconds. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test (appropriate
for matched pair of subjects) reveals that there existed a
significant difference in registration time between Q-A and
control conditions (W = 450.5, p < 0.01).
Correlations. We were interested to see if the registration
time for a participant would have any correlation with her
login time and the required number of attempts for a successful
authentication in Q-A. Our results show that the registration
TABLE III
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF Q-A IN
DIFFERENT ONLINE ACCOUNTS. SCORES ARE OUT OF 10.
Online accounts Mode Median
Bank 9 9
Webmail 9 6
Social Networking 5 5
University Portal 6 6.5
E-commerce 10 8
time and login time in Q-A were not strongly correlated in
either Recall-1 (r = 0.25) or Recall-2 (r = 0.26). Also, there
existed no strong correlation between the registration time and
the required number of attempts in Q-A for a successful login
in either Recall-1 (r = −.05) or in Recall-2 (r = .20).
Number of mistakes. During registration in Q-A, answers
are shown as asterisks or dots to reduce the risk of shoulder
surfing, and the users have to re-enter an answer to confirm.
Our results show that users did not make any mistake when
confirming the answers. We have deployed some basic re-
strictions in our system to guard against poor answers (e.g.,
minimum three characters in an answer, no repeat answers
between questions, at least two different letters in an answer).
In this respect, six participants attempted to enter an identical
answer for multiple questions, and when they saw the error
message they entered distinct answers for each question.
E. User Opinion and Perception
In order to gain an understanding of users’ perceptions
on the usability and applicability of Q-A, we asked them to
answer two sets of Likert scale questions at the end of the
second session. We used ten-point Likert scales, where anchors
were included on the bi-polar ends of the scale (1 indicating
strong disagreement and 10 equalling strong agreement with
the given statement). We reversed some of the questions to
avoid bias; thus the scores marked with (*) were reversed
before calculating the mode and median. A higher score
always indicates a more positive result for Q-A. Since Likert
scale data are ordinal, it is most appropriate to calculate mode
and median for Likert-scale responses [38].
Usability. The perceptions of users on the usability of Q-
A are illustrated in Table II. Users showed a high degree of
satisfaction on the usability (e.g., memorability, ease of login)
of our scheme, and they preferred Q-A over system-assigned
textual passwords. The participants responded positively (i.e.,
mode and median were higher than neutral) about the ease
of using Q-A either weekly or daily. Although they expressed
concerns regarding the authentication time in Q-A, they re-
ported that with practice they could log in quickly with this
scheme.
Applicability. Table III shows users’ perceptions on the
applicability of Q-A in different types of online accounts. Our
findings suggest that most of the participants would strongly
prefer to use Q-A for online accounts with high security
requirements, such as banking and e-commerce accounts.
The participants were given an open-ended question at the
end of second session to express their opinion about Q-A. In
general, the feedbacks were positive and encouraging. They
expressed high degree of satisfaction on the security features
TABLE IV
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES TO THE REQUIREMENT OF RECORDING
PASSWORDS IN REAL LIFE
Scheme Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always
Q-A 55% 36% 9% 0% 0%
Control 0% 14% 46% 36% 4%
of Q-A. For example, one participant reported, “I would use it
for banks and other websites, where I use confidential info.”
Several of them were interested to know if Q-A would be
deployed commercially.
Password recording. All the participants reported that they
did not write down their control nor Q-A passwords for this
study. We also asked them if they would require writing down
their Q-A or control passwords if they would use them in real
life. The results (see Table IV) are quite promising in this
respect: 55% of participants reported that they would never
need to record their Q-A password, while 36% of participants
would rarely need to. Only two (9%) of the participants
mentioned that they would sometimes require to write down
their Q-A password.
For control passwords, 46% of participants would some-
times require and 36% of participants would often need to
record their password.
VI. DISCUSSION
The login success rate for Q-A was found to be 100% in
both Recall-1 and Recall-2. Here we discuss the anticipated
factors that might have played an important role to gain such
high a performance during authentication.
• Q-A asks for already known information that are related
to the long term memory of a user. So, the user does
not have to memorize any artificial information as her
authentication secret.
• Q-A provides users with the flexibility to choose any six
questions from a set of twenty, which they find most
applicable to them.
• The basic restrictions (see §III-C) should have motivated
users to enter the correct answer instead of a weak place-
holder one (‘Aab’). Real answers to cognitive questions
have been shown to be more memorable than placeholder
answers [24].
• Being specific with the question helps to accurately
recall the answer in Q-A. For example: instead of asking
“Where did your father and mother meet?”, we would ask
“In what city or town did your father and mother meet?’
• Q-A makes users focus on fetching a letter from the
given position in her answer, which reduces the chance
of typing mistakes that occur when they have to enter the
whole answer.
• Q-A is case-insensitive, while confusion between capital
and lowercase letters has been shown to be a prominent
reason for making mistakes when answering cognitive
questions [22].
A. Limitations and Ecological Validity
Our participants were young and university educated, which
represents a large number of frequent Web users, but may not
generalize to the entire population. As the study was performed
in a lab setting, we were only able to gather data from 22
participants.
Although field studies may provide superior ecological
validity, lab studies have been preferred to examine brain-
powered memorability of passwords [39]. Moreover, lab stud-
ies have the advantage of taking place in a controlled setting,
which helps to establish performance bounds and figure out
whether field tests are worthwhile in future research.
Our results for login time are conservative since they reflect
initial use. As noted in existing research [13], login time likely
decreases with frequent use of a scheme. Chiasson et al. [40]
find that users get more attentive while entering passwords in
a lab study, which can contribute to less login error and higher
login time than the casual login attempts in real-life scenario.
Further long-term studies in a real life setting could provide
additional insights on the training effect.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our study on Q-A finds that cognitive questions possess
good possibilities in primary authentication in terms of both
usability and security. We note that in addition to providing
sufficient entropy to prevent online guessing attacks, Q-A
is resilient to both internal and external observation attacks.
Memorability in Q-A was found to be 100% in our study.
Users’ feedbacks reveal that they are highly satisfied with
the memorability and security of this scheme, which would
be most appropriate for online accounts with high security
requirements (e.g., online banking, e-commerce [16]).
Now that we have observed promising memorability for
single Q-A password in a lab setting, it seems reasonable to
plan for a field study with larger and more diverse populations
in order to examine if cognitive questions can provide a usable
solution to the memorability and interference problems with
multiple passwords.
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